

Modeling Citizenship in Turkey's Miniature Park

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This article discusses the design and wider political significance of Miniaturk, a nonprofit cultural heritage site that opened in Istanbul in 2003. It analyzes how image, publicity, and architectural form have come together to rework memory to conform to a new perceived relationship between citizens and the Turkish state. As a site of architectural miniatures, Miniaturk provides an escape from the experience of the everyday. But it also must be understood in dialectic relation to gigantic new sites of global capital around the city. Miniature parks are a global type with a long history. The article seeks to understand why a miniature Turkey has only just appeared, and why it has been received with such enthusiasm in the context of contemporary Turkish politics. How can its appeal be interpreted in relation to comparable sites? As a cultural “showcase,” how does it represent Istanbul, Turkey, and the concept of Turkish citizenship?

The Municipality of Istanbul has aroused great controversy recently by its willingness to play host to the giant building proposals of global capital. As the city acquires transparent new buildings of steel and glass, immense public debate has been excited by an ironic lack of transparency in the web of international investment behind them.

Yet, only three years ago, the Istanbul Municipality was applauded for its new miniature “heritage” park, Miniaturk. The park exhibits scale models of architectural showpieces chosen for their significance in the city’s and Turkey’s collective memory (FIG. 1). In comparison to the recent gigantic projects, Miniaturk was praised as a locally conceived and financed project that enabled visitors’ identification with a shared culture.

Similar miniature parks abound around the world and often reveal much about the contexts in which they are situated. Private enterprises like Disneyland (1955) can become hallmarks of national experience. Other, state-controlled examples may more explicitly attempt to reconfigure the relationship between a nation and its citizens.

FIGURE 1. *Miniaturk's 2003 brochure shows, from left to right, the diagrammatic location of the park in the city, an unstaged snapshot of visitors in the park, and a staged shot of an ideal family behind the Byzantine church-turned-mosque-turned-museum of Hagia Sophia under the words, "The Showcase of Turkey."*
 Source: *Miniaturk: Turkey's Showcase* (Istanbul: Kültür A.Ş., 2003).



Ultimately, the tradition of such open-air cultural parks may be traced to the international exhibitions that provided a venue for expressions of national identity in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, the building of grand capital cities such as Ankara, independence monuments, and monumental promenades also aimed to display and legitimize the authority of new nation-states. Using gigantic scale and nationalist narrative, such architectural interventions called on citizens to place their faith in the state. As if to reproduce the child's faith in his parents, they attempted to present the state as having the best interests of its citizens at heart.¹

Miniaturk, too, invites citizens to believe in the benevolence of the state. But by selecting miniaturization and simulation, it adopts a different palette of spatial techniques. The goal is comparable, however — to appeal to citizens to imagine the nation in its entirety, and to promote a new understanding of citizenship based on a shared culture.

Since its opening in 2003, Miniaturk's success has been enormous. It has found a place in the city's popular historical landscape, and Istanbul's guided tours and printed guides now incorporate it next to well-known historical sites. As the press gave it keen and enduring support, the total number of visitors rose to more than two million by the end of its first two years. Other cities have now begun to follow Istanbul's lead and build their own mini-cities.²

As a utopian site, Miniaturk has been particularly welcome in a Turkey disturbed through the 1990s by the rise of ethnic and religious identities. It has presented the tantalizing case of a cultural attraction that could be appreciated across the social and political spectrum. In particular, Miniaturk has offered visitors participation in a naturalized and inclusive past — and perhaps the possibility of an imagined unified future. Translating the miniature park typology into a viable substitute for the gigantic expressions of state and global capital, Miniaturk has also created a new national pilgrimage site that recognizes the rise of Istanbul as Turkey's vehicle of globalization.³

In contrast to the threats that other global-city projects seemed to pose for Istanbul and the country, however, Miniaturk has not triggered any visible opposition.⁴ It was built on publicly owned land by a nonprofit corporation (Kültür A.Ş.) owned by the local government (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality). And even though its estimated construction cost of around \$10 million was reportedly acquired from corporate sponsors, it did not appear to represent any particular private interest. Instead, it has been presented as a public service — not a free-to-access public space such as an urban park, but a semipublic space more akin to a museum. Once visitors pay the entry fee, their activities are regulated only by the gaze of security personnel and other visitors. They are free to wander the grounds as long as they like, and as long as they look at the models from a distance, without touching them.

It is my supposition here that understanding the place and significance of Miniaturk in the popular historical landscape can shed light on the public reaction to other building projects in Istanbul. The park can also be seen as expounding a turning point in Turkish politics, as Islamism has moved to the political center from its previous position of opposition. Finally, Miniaturk illuminates changing notions of citizenship and national identity in a globalizing city.

POLITICAL CONTEXT

National unity has long been a source of collective paranoia in Turkey. Following World War II, fears for national sovereignty were fuelled by Cold War politics. Since the early 1990s, separatist movements and violent developments in the Balkans and the Middle East have again exacerbated such fears. As a result, the rise of Islamism and Kurdish nationalism at home have been regarded as threats to national sovereignty, rather than a call for social justice and democracy.

The decision to build a bounded miniature park where the nation could be viewed in its entirety may partially be seen as a response to anxieties about Turkey's future. Two principal observations reinforce such a suggestion. At the level of image, Miniaturk stage-manages history by painting a misleading picture of societal harmony. And at the level of production, it attempts to provide a showcase for both the quality and effectiveness of local government and the central government's political vision for the country.⁵

Interestingly, as I will explain, the version of history presented at the park is open to different readings according to a visitor's subject position, condition of viewing, and knowledge of Turkish history and politics. Those involved in creating the park may also have interpreted its purpose dissimilarly. Ultimately, its form has embodied negotiation between a range of politicians, administrators, designers, engineers, builders, consultants and sponsors. Yet, despite these interpretive ambiguities, Miniaturk has been successfully promoted through advertising and word of mouth. Stories have been written in local magazines and newspapers; write-ups have appeared in tourist and architectural guides to the city; and images of the park have been posted on billboards (managed by the company that built the park).

With so much coverage and so many actors, it is understandable that certain discrepancies have surfaced in terms of credit for its design. One of the figures involved in these disputes has been Istanbul's ex-Mayor Müfit Gürtuna, who has insisted on tying Miniaturk to commemorations of the historic conquest of Istanbul by the Ottoman Empire in 1453.⁶ Gürtuna was elected from the Justice and Development Party (AKP), an offshoot of the Welfare Party (RP) which turned such commemorations into major spectacles in Istanbul in the 1990s. In numerous interviews, Gürtuna has boasted that Miniaturk was merely one of 550 projects with which he planned to celebrate the 550th anniversary of this event.

By contrast, Miniaturk's administrator, Cengiz Özdemir, has consistently presented Miniaturk as a product of his own personal vision. To confuse matters, in the local press Özdemir has repeatedly been characterized as Miniaturk's architect. Meanwhile, the real architect, Murat Uluğ, has been excluded from the Municipality's official publications and publicity efforts. In return, Uluğ has described the project in the architectural press as a result of his own autonomous design decisions.⁷

Among those officially credited with the project — including the mayor, the model makers, and history professors recruited for consultations — Özdemir has made the most of it in terms of publicity. As he tells it, he first visited and was impressed by the Dutch miniature city of Madurodam (1952) during a stay in the Netherlands from 1979 to 1993. Upon returning to Turkey, Özdemir started working at the Municipality's "Corporation for Culture" (Kültür A.Ş.), set up in 1989 to manage the city's cultural activities. Then, in 1999, after being promoted to Kültür A.Ş.'s chairman, he personally

oversaw the construction of Miniaturk, turning it into Kültür A.Ş.'s key project — and thereby fulfilling a personal dream, according to official Miniaturk publicity.

Özdemir's public visibility as a result of Miniaturk eventually catapulted him into a high-paying job in the private sector. In February 2005 he was appointed chairperson of a media conglomerate (Star Media) that had recently changed hands as a result of government intervention. The transfer from the Uzan Group to the Doğan Group also had political implications, since the Uzan group had been a major supporter of a rival party to the AKP in the 2002 elections. Apparently, Özdemir's experience chairing Kültür A.Ş. between 1999–2005 and the public visibility he achieved primarily through Miniaturk were sufficient credentials to qualify him as chair of a media group that owned radio and TV stations, newspapers, and numerous other companies.

In contrast, Mayor Gürtuna was demoted by his own party from candidacy in the following local elections, and was succeeded in office by Kadir Topbaş. In the meantime, however, he fulfilled a rumor that began while he was Istanbul's popular mayor, and has become a potential political rival/threat to the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan. Gürtuna is presently working to establish his own political party.⁸

These complexities in part explain why Miniaturk was opened three times: first, on April 23, 2003; second, by Prime Minister Erdoğan on May 2, 2003; and finally, by Mayor Gürtuna on May 29, 2003, for the 550th anniversary conquest commemoration.⁹

Significantly, the first opening coincided in the official calendar of the Republic with "National Sovereignty and Children's Day." By conflating national sovereignty with a celebration of the child, the date not only implies that the preservation of sovereignty should be a concern of children, but casts adult citizens in the role of children in relationship to the state. By comparison, Istanbul's conquest commemoration date, May 29, is not listed on the official calendar of the Republic.¹⁰ Instead, the marketing of Miniaturk as a conquest-commemoration project must be viewed in relation to the rise of Islamism and its strategies to challenge and appropriate national history. As Republican history is stage-managed via days such as April 23, May 19 (Atatürk Commemoration, Youth and Sports Day), and October 29 (Republic Day), the Islamists felt a need to establish alternative days commemorating important events from Turkey's Ottoman past.

The backdrop for such competing programs of commemoration involves the reluctance of official nationalist history to recognize the accomplishments of the Ottomans. For years the Republic has attempted to establish itself as a secular, West-oriented nation-state, in historic opposition to the old, Islamic, "Eastern" Ottoman Empire. And by downplaying conquest-commemoration festivities, the Republic has also sought to avoid upsetting the "European club" by conjuring memories of a past when the Ottoman Turks were a rival power in Europe.¹¹

For their part, Islamists have turned to Ottoman nostalgia precisely because of, and as a reaction to, the secular Turkish establishment. The Ottomans had self-consciously promoted a multicultural society as well as claiming the leadership of Islam. In contrast, the early Republic (1923–50) disreputed the public display of religion.

The state promoted civic nationalism manufacturing a homogeneous national identity out of a very diverse population, and ended up imposing the language (Turkish) and the religion (Sunni Islam) of the majority.¹² Accordingly, citizenship emphasized the individual's duties to the nation state rather than his or her rights.¹³ However, market reforms in the 1980s, political liberalization in the 1990s, and the E.U. membership process at the beginning of 2000s have all contributed to a reevaluation to accepted norms of citizenship, national identity, and the assumed correspondence between them. As Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İcduygu have explained:

... while giving the masses political rights, [the Republic] demanded at the same time that they accord normative primacy to the national interest over individual freedoms, to duties over rights, and to state sovereignty over individual autonomy. Thus, the making of modern Turkey involved the transformation of masses into citizens, but prevented the language of rights from entering into the process of the construction of a secular national identity.¹⁴

This relationship between the state and the citizen is perhaps nowhere more spatially expressed than in the siting and design of the Mausoleum (Anıtkabir, 1941–53) of the first leader of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938). Upon Atatürk's death, the Mausoleum was constructed on an imposing hill in the new capital city of Ankara. According to Sibel Bozdoğan, its architecture is “a monumental and abstract version of the classical temple incorporating numerous prehistoric Anatolian references in its decorative program.”¹⁵ Various features of the building also seek to embody and define early Republican ideals about the correct relationship between citizen and nation state. Michael Meeker has observed:

The citizen stands before the Hall of Honor in the presence of the leader and founder in order to pay his respects. The three written communications announce the framework within which this interpersonal exchange takes place. Citizen and founder interact within a framework of constraints imposed by nationhood. In exchange for individual sacrifice there is the promise of the sublime. . . .¹⁶

These communications warn the citizen of external threats, the urgency of protecting sovereignty, and the sacrifice needed — rather than “the democratic principle of popular representation.”¹⁷

In the years since it was built, the Mausoleum has served as Turkey's official nationalist pilgrimage site. It is where state ceremonies are held, and private and public associations gather there to pay their respects to Atatürk and display their commitment to protect the nation. In the 1990s protests also took place there against such perceived threats to the secular establishment as the headscarf.

One result of the rise of Islamism in the public sphere in the 1990s has been to challenge the state-sanctioned narrative of national identity, and the need to give physical representation to these forces has resulted in efforts to rediscover Istanbul's urban history as the former Ottoman capital. Alev Çınar has argued that the substitute narratives of nationhood produced by the Islamists seek to cast Istanbul as a “victim” (of the Republic) — thus, the reenactment of its conquest symbolically serves to “save” it from the Republic.¹⁸

In 1994, Çınar explained, the Islamist Municipality and an Islamist nongovernmental organization (the National Youth Foundation) jointly organized the conquest celebration as an event which would rival national commemoration days in scope and scale.¹⁹ Among other things, this drew public and academic attention to Islamist claims to public spaces in the city. The victory of the RP in the local elections in major cities, and specifically Tayyip Erdoğan's in Istanbul, raised further alarms. And when RP leader Necmettin Erbakan became Turkey's first Islamist Prime Minister in 1996 concerns mounted even further. Some even asked if Turkey was set to turn into a new Iran. However, in 1997, the army, which sees itself as the protector of the secular Republic, intervened and ousted the RP.²⁰ The constitutional court then closed down both the RP and its successor, the Virtue Party. These moves by a coalition of the army and other secular elites to block the rise of Islamists swayed electoral support to a reformist faction within the RP.

In 2002 this faction, now represented by the AKP, won the general elections under the leadership of Istanbul's prominent former mayor Erdoğan, in part by promoting an economic program of “communitarian-liberal synthesis.”²¹ In response to questions regarding his new, “reformed,” position, Erdoğan defined himself not as an Islamist but as a “conservative democrat.” Although he used Islamist devices in his daily performance as prime minister, he made it clear that he considered religion a private issue and that the AKP would not conflate religion and government, Islam and democracy.²²

The AKP subsequently used the European Union membership process to negotiate potential threats to it from the secularist establishment. It advocated a much milder adherence to religion than the RP, and it recognized a need for societal plurality. In defining its conservative stance, Ahmet İnsel has written that the AKP “considers ‘the historical experience and cultural wealth of our nation a solid ground for our future.’”²³

A GROUND FOR CONVERSATION?

The differences between the RP and the AKP can also be understood through the different kinds of representations they have produced of the city and the nation. Miniaturk is a prime example. In representing cultural “wealth,” the park does not single out the Islamic Ottoman past, as RP’s conquest-commemoration reenactments do. But it still privileges Istanbul over Ankara, the capital built to showcase nation-building in the early Republican era. Thus, while it incorporates sites from Anatolia in line with Republican history writing, it constrains those *from* Republican history. Further, the models in Miniaturk aim to represent major religious communities that cohabited the land — in line with what is today perceived as Ottoman cosmopolitanism.

The contradictions in design credits and inaugural dates notwithstanding, Miniaturk’s embrace by the Municipality, the visiting public, and the news media all suggest that the park does facilitate a ground for conversation.

In a meeting with one of Miniaturk’s model makers and a public relations representative, I was intrigued to discover how the two identified with different versions of national history, even while working together. One of my questions was directed at the model maker. When I asked specifically which was his favorite model, he replied that it was the Mağlova Aqueduct (1554–62), and gave the following reasons:

Model Maker: Not because it is a good model; in fact, it was one of our first. . . . I like it because of the work itself. It shows they had the determination, the belief, and the will to work. I am not saying this because of indoctrination: “Ottomans, Oh! Ottomans. . . .” However, every society, like an organism, has a period in which it is alive. . . . For example, if we bring the first and last decades of the Republic together. . . . [Laughs.]

Public Relations Representative: Not even bringing the last century together would suffice. . . . Once, I was leading a group of journalists [in Miniaturk]. One asked why there aren’t many examples from the Republic. And I pointed to the squatter settlements [overlooking the park] and said, “There!” He started exclaiming, “You are indeed Ottomanists,” you are this . . . and you are that. . . . His own cameraman reacted. “Hold on a minute,” he interrupted: “[as if] we have them [Republican landmarks worthy of display], and it is Miniaturk that does not display them?”

Model Maker: But they [squatter settlements] are not the result of the Republic. They exist because of globalization, because of the conjuncture, because of the Cold War. . . .

Public Relations Representative: They are the result of a homogenizing world. Look at a plaza. Is this building in New York, Paris, in Istanbul, or in Tokyo? One cannot

tell. All look the same. But look at a structure from the Middle Ages, and you can tell at a glance where it’s from. If one is more equipped, then one can even identify the country it’s from. But plazas do not allow this.²⁴

In this partial exchange, the model maker conflates the copy (model aqueduct) with the original (real aqueduct). He does not refer to the original as a functional architectural object or space, but as a symbol of technological superiority. The model in Miniaturk, therefore, is a symbol of the second order.

The model maker also suggests that society is an organism, and that architecture is its reflection. Thus, when an organism reaches maturity, it produces monumental architecture and engineering. The Republic, in such a narrative, becomes a period of delayed replenishment that has been terminated by more powerful processes such as internationalization and globalization that have come from without.

For the public relations representative, however, the organism analogy does not work. Her understanding evolves more along an axis of tradition versus modernity. Once there was a time of heterogeneity, but this was defeated by modernization (started with the Ottoman Reformations in the nineteenth century, but pursued forcefully under the Republic through the twentieth). She thus externalizes the Republic as an agent of top-down modernization.

In this analysis, processes of modernization ultimately dictate cultural homogeneity, and Miniaturk becomes a project of resistance because it reinstates heterogeneity. Her untroubled repetition of the story in which she suggested that the informal-looking housing overlooking the park was a monument of the present era speaks to a particular (popular and academic) attitude that blames the Republic, as if it were a person, for everything that has gone wrong in Turkey.

Clearly, the model maker and the public relations representative exhibit different ideas about Ottoman/Turkish history and how the present built environment has come into being. But they parallel each other in their understanding that architecture is an outcome (rather than, for instance, a cause or an agent) of social processes. Thus, while they do not agree at an ideological level, they have been able to work together to produce representations of architecture that not only display, but prove Turkey’s exceptionality. In essence, then, Miniaturk offers a consensus ground for two people who do not share the same conception of history, but who have similar anxieties of cultural homogenization and decline. And the exchange between them illustrates the park’s potential to reveal political differences, just as it facilitates their concealment.

In order to fully understand this conversation, one needs also to understand that sometimes even words have different local connotations. “Plaza,” for instance, does not indicate a space derived from the Italian *piazza*. In its Turkish use, the word has evolved to refer equivocally to commercial highrises in an architectural idiom of steel and glass. “Plazas” came into the discussion because they are

FIGURE 2. *In the second half of the 1980s, beautification of the Golden Horn involved the infill and replacement of its banks with expansive parks, which later remained underused and under-maintained. A tract of parkland was cleared to build Miniaturk. The photograph shows foundation work in 2002. Source: Miniaturk: Turkey's Showcase (Istanbul: Kültür A.Ş., 2003).*



public symbols of globalization. In particular, Prime Minister Erdoğan and his senior aides in the Istanbul Municipality, including the current mayor, are eager to shoulder the global-city project, and have been proud to construct such buildings to “market” Istanbul on a global stage.

Ironically, Miniaturk has also been used to market the city, but its design and status as a “heritage” site seem to set it in a different orbit. Thus, when the public relations representative refers to the homogenization of the built environment via “plazas,” she assumes that Miniaturk somehow resists this process. What she chooses not to see is that all projects involving prime sites offered to global capital or leisure environments such as Miniaturk are characteristic of globalization. Both are domestic translations of global types; both entail the rerouting of public sources into private or privatized services; and both are designed to demonstrate Turkey’s competitiveness in the global marketplace.

Nevertheless, the specific ways in which they evolve, and are received, may be unique to the context of Istanbul and Turkey. Looking from within a miniature Turkey, gigantic projects of global capital appear external and threatening. By contrast, Miniaturk reflects a desire to imagine a Turkey that displays its cultural wealth while being clearly bounded and secured. As “Turkey’s Showcase,” it becomes a key site in which contemporary Turkish national identity can be projected.

RESTORING A DREAM

Miniaturk is located in Sütlüce on the north shore of the Golden Horn, the estuary dividing the old Istanbul from the new.²⁵ This area long suffered from industrialization-induced pollution and illegal housing widely regarded as eyesores. Its pollution had become an issue as early as the 1960s. In the second half of the 1980s, the city’s mayor, Bedrettin Dalan, carried out a major cleansing effort that concentrated on the beautification of the estuary rather than its environmental ecology or historic character. He demolished buildings, displaced residents, and replaced estuary banks with parks.

Miniaturk is part of continuing efforts to cleanse the estuary (FIG. 2). In the words of ex-Mayor Gürtuna, who officially approved and opened Miniaturk, this will “bring back the old magnificence of the area.”²⁶ Of course, such “old magnificence” refers to its appearance during the preindustrial Ottoman period, when it featured public leisure gardens.²⁷

In addition to being part of a local urban-renewal campaign that concentrates on the Golden Horn, Miniaturk can also be understood as participating in a larger process that seeks to establish Istanbul as a “global brand.”²⁸ Other highlights of this urban renewal include the launching of two private universities, a museum, a cultural center, and a congress center. The first such investment was by the Koç Corporation, which renovated a former anchor factory in Hasköy as a museum of transport in 1991. Nearby Miniaturk, the old Sütlüce Slaughterhouse is now being transformed into a congress center. Across the estuary, the Imperial Fez Factory in Defterdar is being turned into a cultural center. Other projects include the renovations of the Silahtarağa Electricity Plant by the private Bilgi University as an arts center and faculty, and the Cibali Tobacco Factor into faculty buildings by the private Kadir Has University. This concentration of cultural investment around the Golden Horn reflects a reappraisal of land values and access, history and heritage. But it also mirrors a worldwide trend to revitalize abandoned industrial buildings, and in addition to cleansing the area of unwanted sights, these projects will inevitably bring gentrification.

In terms of its design, Miniaturk aims to abstract itself from its surroundings (FIG. 3). In the words of Uluğ, the park deliberately seeks to create a “tale-like environment.”²⁹ A tall fence blocks off all external views of the interior, and the entrance complex containing administrative and commercial functions, a restaurant, and a shop faces a parking lot rather than the street. From here a carefully controlled entry sequence reinforces the sense of separation. First, a ramp takes visitors to a large raised terrace over a mini-botanical park. And it is only after paying their fees and passing through the entry gates that visitors arrive at a vantage point where Miniaturk is revealed to them (FIGS. 4, 5).



FIGURE 3. Plan published by Miniaturk to solicit models from model makers. (North is down.) Source: Miniaturk Mini Türkiye Parkı Sponsorluk Rehberi (Istanbul: Kültür A.Ş., July 2002).

From this elevated location, visitors can enjoy a view of the entire park from behind a long balustrade, or they can take one of two symmetrical ramps down to the ground-level walkways that traverse the park. The ramp to the right provides immediate access to an outdoor café and children's playground to the north of the central area. When it meets the exhibition level, visitors encounter the first model, Mevlana's Mausoleum (1274, Konya). According to the printed guide, this "... bears witness to the multi-cultural nature of Anatolia."³⁰ The second model is of the Selimiye Mosque (1568–75, Edirne). The third is of Atatürk's Mausoleum.

Only 75 models were listed in the park's 2003 visitor's guide (36 from Istanbul, 31 from Anatolia, and 8 from "abroad"). Additions, now underway, will increase the total number and density of the models, and will transform the spatial experience of the exhibition space. However, the overall boundaries and thematic groupings of the park will remain.³¹ The exhibition space is organized into two main circular areas. The one closer to the entrance terrace (to the east) contains

Anatolian sites; the other (to the west) contains Istanbul sites, and is organized around a pond that stands in for the Bosphorus. A model bridge connects across the pond to a raised café at the park's western end. Outside the central areas, at the south edge of the park, a third group of models presents a curious lineup of buildings dubbed "Ottoman Geography." The buildings here were selected, publications state, because they were "built or renovated during the Ottoman Empire."

According to renowned history professors İlber Ortaylı and Haluk Dursun, who created the list of sites to be modeled in the park, the criteria for selection were originality and representativeness.³² But the final list also overtly attempts to demonstrate how Turks have respected and valued the cultural achievements of other peoples who have lived in their lands, even under "invasion, war and destruction."³³ Such a statement can be seen as problematic, however, in light of a history with counter claims.³⁴

Both Ortaylı and Dursun are specialists in Ottoman history. The third group clearly also aims to enhance the idea



FIGURE 4. (LEFT) The entrance complex to the east of the site faces a parking lot. It houses administrative and commercial functions including ticket booths, a restaurant and a shop. An angular ramp takes visitors up to a raised terrace over a mini-botanical park. Photo by author.



FIGURE 5. (RIGHT) After paying the entry fee, visitors are treated to their first overview of the exhibition site from the entry terrace. Photo by Ömer Faruk Şen.

that Turks not only respected and contributed to other civilizations within the borders of present-day Turkey, but to cultures once contained within the larger administrative umbrella of the Ottoman Empire.

Overall, the grouping of models in the park operates at two levels: organization by sections, and organization of models within sections. Preliminary designs show that Uluğ once conceived the park as an artificial green mound. His early drawings also show the exhibition area as comprising two tangential circles of different diameters spotted with tiny circles of different sizes to represent different models. However, within these areas that came to represent Turkey and Istanbul, the architect has denied any involvement in configuring the arrangement of individual models in relation to each other, or determining the nature of the representations. He claims that Miniaturk's representatives set this agenda.

These aspects of the park are indeed thought provoking. In general terms, the models do not replicate the conditions of original structures in any consistent way: some are exact replicas; some restorations; some imagined restorations; and some are presented as ruins. Some original sites are presented in ways that rid them off their symbolic content. And little attempt is made to distinguish between the sites based on the communities they serve(d). Further, some models depict sites that are currently in use, while others are purely historical. There is even one "natural formation" (Pamukkale) (FIGS. 6, 7).

Perhaps most startlingly, some models are divorced from their original urban contexts. Even buildings located literally next to each other in Istanbul may thus be dislocated in their miniature displays. The most pointed examples of this are from the Dolmabahçe and Sultanahmet areas of Istanbul. In these areas of the city, the palace and clock tower, and the Blue Mosque, Hagia Sophia, Topkapı Palace,

and Cistern, share tightly knit urban contexts. But in Miniaturk these structures are positioned without reference to each other. By washing over all such reference to formal and societal context the effect is to "naturalize" the originals.

Another effect of packing several thousand years of history into the park without narrative logic is to render negligible the contributions of the Republican period. In fact, the creators of Miniaturk believe the Republic has produced little architecture significant enough to include there.³⁵ Moreover, the buildings selected to represent both the early Republican period and contemporary times are not necessarily those that would have been included on a list made by the architecture community.³⁶ Rather, they stand as overt political gestures (e.g., Taksim Atatürk Monument), or they represent sponsors (e.g., Yapı Kredi Bank headquarters, designed by McAslan Architects of the U.K.). Overall, the selection of sites and their arrangement in relation to each other without recourse to geography, context or chronology creates a calculated confusion that reinforces the idea of cultural wealth, but hinders historical and societal complexities.

One image that Miniaturk repeatedly uses in promotional publications (possibly to represent its inclusive politics) shows Atatürk's Mausoleum and the Selimiye Mosque together (FIG. 8). The coupling brings into mind the controversy around the Mausoleum and the new Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara (modeled on several Imperial Ottoman mosques, including Selimiye).³⁷ In reality, the Mausoleum and the Kocatepe Mosque stand at similar elevations, and crown the two highest hills of the capital city. They thus represent competing claims to Turkey's national imaginary — the Mausoleum standing in for secular modernism, the mosque for a modern Islam.³⁸

The composition of the Miniaturk promotional photograph is similarly complex in symbolic terms, and yields two



FIGURE 6. (LEFT) *The models do not all replicate their originals in the same way. In the foreground is the model of Hacı Bektaş Veli Dervish Lodge near the city of Nevşehir. In the immediate background is the model of The Church of Virgin Mary near the city of Izmir. The printed guide explains of the latter building that “only its apse stands today.” Nevertheless, the complete church was modeled in Miniaturk on the basis of references and other resources. This photograph also shows the audio-information panel that is activated by each visitor’s smart ticket. Photo by author.*

FIGURE 7. (RIGHT) *Some models are of originals in which communities presently live, while others are of abandoned sites. There is even one “natural formation” (Pamukkale). This image shows how that model seamlessly conflates the exhibition of the “Fairy Chimneys,” rock formations, and subterranean dwellings of Cappadocia in Central Anatolia (dark conical forms in the foreground) with a representation of the naturally formed terraced (white) pools of Pamukkale in Western Anatolia. Photo by Ömer Faruk Şen.*

very different readings. According to one, the Mausoleum, the symbol of Republican nationalism, is clearly foregrounded. But the position of the Mausoleum model on flat ground can alternatively be seen as negating its elevated position in relation to the capital city and the nation. The photograph also shows a few spectators giving a passing glance to the Mausoleum while many more crowd around the mosque. The implication of this second reading is that Atatürk’s Republican ideals lie buried at a time when the Ottoman past is becoming increasingly attractive. The angle of view in the image further contributes to this reading by locating the mosque above the Mausoleum on the printed page.

Of course, the embodied experience of the park does not privilege any such static point of view. The layout of routes through the park is based on an assumption that visitors will stay for two hours.³⁹ During this time, security personnel and visual and audio messages repeatedly remind them to avoid walking on the grass or touching the models. Meanwhile, a specially commissioned musical composition, by Fahir Atakoğlu (known for his patriotic works) is broadcast from disguised speakers, and detailed information on individual landmarks is provided in a booklet, as well as through an audio information system activated by the individual user (and again heard through disguised speakers).

FIGURE 8. *This photograph was used in several of Miniaturk’s publications. The framing foregrounds the Mausoleum, yet establishes the imperial mosque as the center of attraction. Source: Miniaturk: Turkey’s Showcase (Istanbul: Kültür A.Ş., 2003).*



FIGURE 9. *The only model visitors can touch and walk on is that of the Bosphorus Bridge, which crosses the artificial pond on the site. Photo by author.*



The lack of shade, lack of seating, narrow width of paths, and admonishments against touching the models (or even getting close to them) all lead visitors to view the models while in motion. Only on the model of the Bosphorus Bridge are visitors treated somewhat differently. The actual suspension bridge connects Asia and Europe and is traversed

only by motor vehicles. But here it serves as a finale of sorts, raising visitors from the ground level to the elevated café on the Western edge of the park, from where they can look back over the park and contemplate the image of the nation that has just been presented to them (FIG. 9).

Even though the design of the park aims to abstract itself from its surroundings, the surrounding topography impinges in the form of nearby hillside apartment buildings that create an unavoidable backdrop to the models (the source of the public relations representative's disturbance) (FIG. 10). To supplant the visual prominence of these structures from within the park, however, visitors may choose to take a ride on the Golden Horn in a life-size model of an imperial boat — and so conclude their experience by imagining the present-day city through the eyes of an Ottoman sultan. In this way, representations do not end at the boundary of the theme park. Instead, the city becomes an object of contemplation, and perhaps, an inverted extension of Miniaturk.

FROM WORLDS IN MINIATURE TO MINIATURE WORLDS

Miniaturk's form is an interpretation of a specific type of exhibit, examples of which can be found around the world, including several contemporary "mini-nations." Two other particularly well-known state-owned miniature parks are Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Park) and Jinxu Zhonghua (Splendid China) in Shenzhen.⁴⁰ Miniaturk's administrators, however, point specifically to Madurodam in the Netherlands as the model they admired most.⁴¹



FIGURE 10. *The "excess" of the city clearly protrudes into the park. However, this publicity photo "airbrushed" out the apartment buildings in the background. Source: Miniaturk: Turkey's Showcase (Istanbul: Kültür A.Ş., 2003).*

Madurodam's official history claims that it was modeled on the example of Bekonscot (1929 in Beaconsfield, U.K.).⁴²

While various forms of miniature parks can be found across the world, as a group, their genealogy can be traced to the world exhibitions of the nineteenth century. According to Timothy Mitchell, the exhibitions were designed to offer Europeans a picture of the world in miniature.⁴³ There is exhaustive literature on them, but their importance as a precedent for miniature environments such as Miniaturk remains relatively unexplored. The exhibitions did not only contrast the industrial products of the West with the traditional crafts of the East, but also the present modernity of the West with its preindustrial past. Such historical re-creations began at the 1867 Paris Exhibition.⁴⁴ A notable example was the Austrian-sponsored "Old Vienna" at Chicago's 1893 Exhibition; and, not to be outdone, the Germans re-created an "Old Berlin" of the 1650s at the Berlin Industrial Exhibition of 1896.⁴⁵ The entertainment created in such installations confirmed the modernity of these late industrializing European cities.

Tony Bennett's oft-quoted argument in the *Birth of the Museum* is that these exhibitions formed part of a nineteenth-century exhibitionary complex, which allowed visitors, particularly from the working class, to emulate middle-class manners and interiorize an ideal of national citizenship.⁴⁶ The typology of the open-air museum which emerged at the end of the nineteenth century may be regarded as an effort to turn the temporary environments of the exhibitions into permanent installations. Open-air museums also created permanent spaces where supposed national folkways could be frozen in time.

Stockholm's Skansen (1891) is generally cited as the first such open-air museum. It contained real farmhouses, dislocated and reassembled from different parts of Sweden. Supposedly representative not only of different regions but of different time periods, the houses were brought to the capital city and placed next to each other to create the image of a timeless, static folk life.⁴⁷ To sell the idea of a graspable, nostalgic national identity, Skansen was advertised as "Sweden in miniature." According to Bennett an important difference between nineteenth-century museums and such open-air museums was that the former excluded the lower classes from its represented narratives, while the latter "work[ed] on the ground of popular memory and restyle[d] it."⁴⁸

Today's miniature parks go one step further because the objects they present are newly made, with no claim to authenticity. Moreover, while open-air museums like Skansen seek to simulate a lived environment (generally a disappearing, rural one), the miniature park merely present artifacts as symbols. Ownership and management, scale, materiality, organization, and the layout of objects are other aspects that inform the visitor's experience of a miniature park.⁴⁹ In the guise of entertainment, these may be used both to advance a particular political view and inculcate citizens with a sense of national identity.

As already mentioned, the officially declared model for Miniaturk was Madurodam in the Netherlands (FIGS. 11, 12). A comparison, however, reveals that the only real similarity between the two is that both display building models at 1/25 scale. Madurodam's major claim is to present a complete built history of the Netherlands. To accomplish this, it takes the form of a city that has grown outward radially from a medieval core. Such a comprehensive, integrative urban program is missing at Miniaturk. But there are other differences that clearly have been determined by differences in institutional framework and socio-political context.

For instance, since Madurodam is established and managed by a charitable foundation, it is unrestrained by direct political influence. This means that it can also turn politics into an object of display. Thus, Madurodam has a mayor and a city council, whose members are chosen from nearby schools, and who attend and receive any new models added to the park in "official" ceremonies.⁵⁰

Madurodam also sets miniature people in its representative tableaux with the stated aim of portraying the Dutch way of life. In contrast, the models in Miniaturk are devoid of social life, isolated from any urban context, and laid out in a seemingly arbitrary manner.⁵¹ Instead of trying to depict an overt normative Turkish or Islamic-Turkish character, the park's main rhetorical purpose thus seems to be to indicate the tolerance of Turkey to multiple cultures and ways of life.

A third difference is that while the Dutch miniature city is laid out according to a pseudo-realistic plan, which might allow infinite extension, Miniaturk's final size has been predetermined.⁵² Such a condition seems subliminally to relate to the histories of the two countries: a miniature Netherlands must be able to expand, but the border of a miniature Turkey must be properly secured.

Finally, Madurodam uses the concept of a city to represent the nation, whereas Miniaturk differentiates between city and nation. Moreover, it privileges one specific city, Istanbul, giving it almost equal space in its representation as the rest of the national territory.

To understand Miniaturk, it is also helpful to look at Indonesia's Taman Mini.⁵³ Taman Mini was initiated in the early 1970s by the wife of Indonesian President Suharto, following an inspiring tour of Disneyland in the U.S.⁵⁴ Like Miniaturk, Taman Mini has been portrayed as the result of a single visionary individual's quest to import a Western type of institution. In both cases the central idea has also been to create a national image in miniature.

Taman Mini differs from Miniaturk in several important respects. Perhaps most significantly, it orders its imaginary nation according to official geographical divisions. Thus, each Indonesian province is represented by a pavilion around a central artificial pond that represents the Indonesian Archipelago.⁵⁵ In practice, therefore, Taman Mini pavilions serve as show-rooms — full-scale ideal representations that mix the typical architectural characteristics of each geographical region. By



FIGURE 11. (RIGHT)
Madurodam in the Netherlands uses miniature people in its tableaux. Source: Madurodam, The Hague.

FIGURE 12. (BELOW)
Madurodam's surface area has increased three times since it first opened in 1952. Its conceptual planning allows for expansion. Source: Madurodam, The Hague.



contrast, the simulated geography of Miniaturk is divided into three, largely conceptual, categories — the city (Istanbul), the country (Anatolia), and “abroad” — and the element of water represents not the three real seas that surround the country, but the Bosphorus, the narrow strait on which Istanbul stretches.

According to its promotional book: “Taman Mini ‘Indonesia Indah’ is created to show the whole of Indonesia on a small scale, in order to enable people to ‘tour’ Indonesia without actually having to visit the 27 provinces, which of course would take up much time and money.”⁵⁶ The logic here not only involves

the re-creation of Indonesia as a graspable object for the tourist gaze, but it implies an expectation that citizens will learn the national territory, or at least enact this duty, by visiting the park.

Indeed, both Taman Mini and Miniaturk promote citizenship based on an appreciation of diversity (“Unity in Diversity”). Yet, under the appearance of preserving it in the former, and in simulating culture by copying architectural showpieces in the latter, both end up effacing diversity.

What remains further peculiar about Miniaturk is that half the original structures modeled in it may still be found in Istanbul. Why would Istanbul be the locus for such a collection of representations when visitors could just as easily visit the originals? This condition suggests that while Istanbul seeks to be a center of cultural imagination, it is a center detached from the imaginary of the nation. Likewise, the nation is left with a displaced center. In trying to represent an ideal of Istanbul, the park also tries to detach itself from the reality of the city around it.

Finally, in interviews with visitors at Miniaturk, I found that different conditions of viewing and subject positions allowed different readings. One visitor, a middle-aged, middle-class woman from Zonguldak, a city in northern Turkey, suggested that real geographical representation would have made the display more truthful. She also commented on the absence of any building from her city from a supposed national display.

Another visitor, an older middle-class man from Istanbul, praised the park for its educational value and suggested that all primary-school students should be brought to it. When I mentioned that many primary schools are already organizing tours there, he expressed concern about the lack of chronology and the possible effect on children of such an “incomprehensible” history.

Clearly, visitors understand and judge the park according to their personal reference systems. They may also understand Miniaturk’s inclusivity as a form of nostalgia. But, in the end, their appreciation of the park reflects a yearning for alternative modes in which to imagine the nation.

As the ethos of Republican nationalism fades away, other sites have emerged to challenge Atatürk’s Mausoleum as a center of national symbolism. Miniaturk is clearly the latest of these. And since it is a miniature, it offers the possibility to grasp the entire nation as if it were an island separated from everyday reality and history.

SEARCH FOR A GLOBAL SYMBOLISM

In their use of scale as a representational strategy, miniature parks paradoxically work in tandem with the promenades of national capitals. In resorting to the miniature and the gigantic, both disrupt the real and the experience of the everyday. The national promenade may present progress-oriented spaces in accordance with an official narrative. In contrast, the national miniature park may level history through the use of seemingly arbitrary layouts. Yet by bringing the lived spaces of the past into the present as precious objects to be looked at, or by removing living spaces from their present contexts, the miniature park may provide an illusionary field on which to imagine a common future.

If one remembers the ceremonial practice at the Mausoleum, where the citizen “stands . . . in the presence of the leader,” one is able to comprehend the appeal of Miniaturk better. At Miniaturk citizens join together to consume culture voluntarily, without obligation. Miniaturk is further popular precisely because it flattens histories and geographies to bring them together without apparent hierarchy or conflict. Yet, while doing so, it also speaks to an imaginary that seeks to attach to a global world via Istanbul.

As the progressivism and secularism of the early Republican nation-building project is increasingly criticized from within and a new plurality emerges in its place, the national symbolic, the archive of official objects and narratives, is due for renovation through additions that cater to a new national polity. There are many, potentially conflicting aspects of this new polity: the recognition of religion; a renewed interest in Istanbul as the potential gateway through which Turkey will join the multicultural European Union; a nostalgia for Ottoman cosmopolitanism; a drive for the bourgeois beautification of the city; and finally, a reconfiguring of the relationship between the state and its citizens in the midst of growing dissent toward the representational quality of the democratic process.

Because Miniaturk seeks to fulfill all these criteria in a Turkey striving to reassert itself as one among equals in a globalizing world, it has potentially become a new nationalist pilgrimage site. It is in this context that discrepancies between people are willingly suppressed, and memory is accordingly stylized.

REFERENCE NOTES

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1. I make this suggestion with Lauren Berlant’s discussion of “infantile citizenship” and the “pilgrimage to Washington” in mind. However, I acknowledge that her argument is more complex than merely identification with an architectural narrative, and rather focuses on a particular form of political agency. L. Berlant, “The Theory of

Infantile Citizenship,” in *The Queen of America Goes to Washington City* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), pp.25–53.
2. For example, the Minicity in Antalya opened in May 2004 (viewed on www.arkitera.com, May 31, 2004); and Batman announced plans for its own miniature park (viewed on www.arkitera.com, July 19, 2003).

3. In considering global-city projects under neoliberalism (and the Mausoleum under Republican nation-building later in this paper) as phases of the “gigantic,” and Miniaturk as their counterpart, I was influenced by Susan Stewart’s discussion of the two concepts. According to Stewart, miniature is usually associated with the private collection, while the gigantic with the public. The latter symbolizes authority — i.e., the state, masculinity, and exteriority; and is experienced partially while on the move. The miniature, on the other hand, presents popularity, femininity, and interiority, and is experienced as a transcendental space frozen in time. Because the miniature is an “island,” Stewart suggests it feeds fantasies and yearning for an imagined past, including a pure childhood state. S. Stewart, *On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993).

4. Recent global-city projects, such as the Haydarpaşa Port, Galataport, and the Dubai Towers, in which publicly owned prime sites in Istanbul are to be privatized, were all met with criticism in the media and have been resisted by civil-society organizations. All three projects were announced in 2005, and there has been extensive coverage of them in Turkish media. By contrast, there were only a few voices raised against public spending on a “new” site such as Miniaturk, while “real” heritage nearby awaits reinvestment in decrepitude. See O. Ekinçi, “Dünya Mirasında ‘Miniaturk’! . . .,” *Istanbul’un “İslambol” On Yılı* (Istanbul: Anahtar Yayınları, 2004), pp.53–55.

5. Technically, the park was launched by the Municipality of Istanbul, which has a certain autonomy from the central government in Ankara. However, the top officers of the Municipality are elected in the nationally held local elections from amongst politicians.

6. C. Dila interview with Müfit Gürtuna, “Değişen Dünya ve İstanbul,” *Gezinti*, (Summer 2003), pp.20–23.

7. M. Uluğ, “Miniaturk,” *Arredamento Mimarlık* (September 2001), pp.38–39. Also, M. Uluğ, “Miniaturk,” *Yapı*, No.262 (September 2003), pp.71–74. Among other things, Uluğ claims he decided on the site after consultations involving several alternative locations in the city (personal interview

by author, Nov. 2, 2005).

8. “Ali Müfit Gürtuna yeni parti kurma hazırlığını anlattı.” Viewed on *AA News*, Nov. 18, 2005, on www.nethaber.com.

9. *Faaliyet Raporu* [Activity Report] 2002 (Istanbul: Kültür A.Ş., 2003), p.13.

10. A. Çınar, “National History as a Contested Site: The Conquest of Istanbul and Islamist Negotiations of the Nation,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.43 No.2 (April 2001), p.365. Also see A. Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).

11. The first conquest commemoration festivities were held in its 500th anniversary in 1953. A dedicated association was set up to guide the festivities. The preparations were initiated officially; however, Turkey’s President and Prime Minister at the time abstained from attending because, according to the general interpretation today, Turkey had just entered NATO and wished to keep its relations with its Western allies. Since 1953, the Commemoration Festivities have been repeated in different scales but with minimal state representation.

12. T. W. Smith, “Civic Nationalism and Ethnocultural Justice in Turkey,” *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol.27 No.2 (May 2005), pp.436–470. There is extensive literature on nationalism in Turkey. Smith’s recent article is a useful review.

13. A. Kadioğlu, “Citizenship and Individuation in Turkey: The Triumph of Will over Reason,” *Cemoti*, No.26, viewed on March 28, 2006, on <http://cemoti.revues.org/>.

14. F. Keyman and A. İçduygu, eds., *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences* (London: Routledge, 2005), p.6.

15. Bozdoğan further explains, “As its architects stated in their explanation of the design, it was a built manifesto to the prevailing nationalist history theories that connected the history of the Mediterranean and world civilization to the history of the Turkic peoples.” S. Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), p.289.

16. M. Meeker, “Once There Was, Once

There Wasn’t: National Monuments and Interpersonal Exchange,” in R. Kasaba and S. Bozdoğan, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), pp.157–91.

17. *Ibid.*

18. Çınar, “National History as a Contested Site,” p.383.

19. *Ibid.*, p.366.

20. This process is commonly referred as the “February 28 process.” See Ü. Cizre and M. Çınar, “Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process,” *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol.102 No.2/3 (2003), pp.309–32.

21. As Keyman and İçduygu explain, this synthesis had three principles: “an effective and post-developmental state”; “a regulated free market”; and “social justice.” See Keyman and İçduygu, eds., *Citizenship in a Global World*, p.16.

22. Smith, “Civic Nationalism. . . .”

23. İnel explains: “The AKP states that it considers ‘the historical experience and cultural wealth of our nation a solid ground for our future’ and defines itself as conservative. It compares society to a ‘living organism that survives by replenishing itself in the cultural environment constituted by such entrenched institutions as the family, education, property, religion, and morality.’ It describes the development of this organism by means of an anticonstructivist argument in the style of Hayek, thus clearly marking its distance from the Kemalist project of modernization: ‘The local culture and institutions that are produced and unified within their own natural processes without external intervention do not conflict with universal values.’” A. İnel, “The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey,” *South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol.102 No.2/3 (2003), p.304.

24. Interview with a Miniaturk public relations representative and model maker, Nov. 4, 2005.

25. The Golden Horn (Haliç in Turkish) is an estuary off the Bosphorus, the strait that connects the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara.

26. Viewed Oct. 10, 2004, on www.miniaturk.com.

27. Miniaturk’s publications elaborate on this notion of a lost time. See A.E. Erbaş, “Kimliğimizin Eski ve Yeni Adresi: Sa’dabad’dan Bugüne Haliç,” *Gezi* (Summer

- 2003), pp.14–19.
28. C. Özdemir, *Faaliyet Raporu 2002* (Istanbul: Kültür A.Ş., 2003), p.8.
29. M. Uluğ, “Miniaturk,” *Yapı 262* (September 2003), p.71.
30. *Miniaturk Guide* (Istanbul: Kültür A.Ş., 2003), p.3.
31. The administration also aims to supplement the park with reenactments and other cultural events, so that repeated visits to the park can offer different experiences.
32. The official explanation regarding the selection of landmarks represented in the park states: “Works that found a place in Miniaturk were ones that displayed peculiarities of the era in which they were built, ones that reflected the culture and art of a land that had witnessed thousands of years of heavy invasion, war and destruction, works that had not been destroyed simply because they had been created by those who came before, works that were protected, repaired and enjoyed.” “The Selection of Models,” *The Showcase of Turkey, Miniaturk, The Story of How it Came to Be* (Istanbul: Kültür A.Ş., 2003), p.27.
33. Ibid.
34. Turkey has been criticized for present and past human-rights abuses.
35. Interview by author with Miniaturk public relations representative, Nov. 4, 2005.
36. For example, *Mimarlık*, the publication of the Chamber of Turkish Architects, surveyed prominent architects and architectural historians to determine the twenty most significant buildings in Turkey in 2003. From this list, only Atatürk’s Mausoleum, designed by Emin Onat ve Orhan Arda, is represented in Miniaturk’s 2003 printed guide. *Mimarlık* No.311, viewed Nov. 28, 2005, on <http://www.mimarlarodasi.org.tr>.
37. For more nuanced discussions of artistic sources, see J. Erzen and A. Balamir, “Case study IV: Turkey,” in I. Serageldin and J. Steele, eds., *Architecture of the Contemporary Mosque* (London: Academy Editions, 1996), pp.100–16. Also see Şebnem Yücel, “The City and its Minarets,” paper presented at the IASTE 2004 conference, Sharjah, U.A.E.
38. Meeker, “Once There Was, Once There Wasn’t.”
39. Kültür A.Ş., *Faaliyet Raporu* [Activity Report], 2003, p.17.
40. For a discussion of Taman Mini, see M. Hitchcock, “Tourism, Taman Mini, and National Identity,” *Indonesia and the Malay World*, Vol.26 No.75 (1998), pp.124–35; J. Pemberton, “Recollections from ‘Beautiful Indonesia’: Somewhere Beyond the Post-Modern,” *Public Culture*, Vol.6 No.2 (1994), pp.241–62; J.T. Siegel, *Fetish, Recognition, Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp.3–5; and S. Errington, *The Death of the Authentic Primitive Art: And Other Tales of Progress* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp.194–98. For a discussion of Splendid China, see A. Anagnost, *National Past-Times: Narrative, Representation, and Power in Modern China* (Durham, NC: Duke University, 1997).
41. Administrators of Madurodam served as consultants to the creators of Miniaturk. See Musa Ceylan interview with Peter Verdaaddank, “Miniaturk Excites Us,” *Gezinti*, (Summer 2003), pp.28–31.
42. For information on Bekonscot, see <http://www.bekonscot.com>.
43. Drawing on Martin Heidegger’s essay “The Age of the World Picture,” Mitchell argued that the effect of spectacles, in general, in the West was “to set the world up as a picture,” and so objectify it. The World Exhibition had a particular place within such a regime of spectacle. It combined “authentic” reproductions of the environments of colonized lands with the real bodies of indigenous residents of those lands in an island-like environment separate from the everyday life of the places where they were staged. Mitchell also pointed out that despite attempts to construct the exhibition as a copy, the real world always “presented itself as an extension of the exhibition.” T. Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp.1–33.
44. Z. Çelik, *Displaying the Orient: Architecture of Islam at Nineteenth-Century World’s Fairs* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp.142–43.
45. K. Zelljadt, “Presenting and Consuming the Past, Old Berlin at the Industrial Exhibition of 1896,” *Journal of Urban History*, (March 2005), pp.306–33.
46. T. Bennett, *The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics* (London; New York: Routledge, 1995), pp.59–88.
47. Official website of the “Open Air Museum.” Viewed Nov. 29, 2005, on <http://www.skansen.se/eng/>. Also see M. Sandberg, *Living Pictures, Missing Persons: Mannequins, Museums, and Modernity* (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2003).
48. Bennett, *The Birth of the Museum*, p.118.
49. Errington, *The Death of the Authentic Primitive Art*, p.199.
50. According to Madurodam’s official history, Princess Beatrix acted as mayor until becoming Queen of the Netherlands in 1980. As mayor, she governed a youth city council, members of which were elected from nearby schools. Today, Madurodam’s mayor is selected from among the members of the youth council.
51. Kültür A.Ş.’s *Faaliyet Raporu* [Activity Report] 2002, p.14, states that some ten thousand human figures were inserted to enliven the park. However, I have not come across any model human figures except in the panoramic museum that reenacts the independence war in an indoor space beneath the amphitheater to the west of the park.
52. Madurodam’s surface area has tripled from 21,234 sq.m. in 1952 when the park opened, to 62,626 sq.m. today. “Background Information Madurodam” provided by Madurodam Marketing and Communication Representative Marloes Peeters via personal communication, Nov. 29, 2004.
53. I do not have firsthand experience of Skansen, Madurodam, or Taman Mini. The discussion of Skansen is based on its website and the work of Mark Sandberg. In the case of Madurodam, I have relied on the website and on personal communication with its marketing representative. In the case of Taman Mini, I have relied on the anthropological studies listed in note 41.
54. See Pemberton, “Recollections from ‘Beautiful Indonesia’”; and Hitchcock, “Tourism, Taman Mini, and National Identity,” p.126.
55. Since its opening, numerous new facilities and buildings such as museums have been added to Taman Mini, dramatically altering its experience. Here, I am referring only to the original 1975 core of the park.
56. *Taman Mini “Indonesia Indah”* (Jakarta: Tim Penerbitan Buku HUT ke-17 Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, 1992), p.84.

